Histories

Public-domain translation

Evelyn Shuckburgh (1889) — read at Perseus →

Claims citing this source

• The principal surviving narrative of Agathocles's African campaign, Diodorus Books 19–20, is shaped by the now-lost history of Timaeus of Tauromenium, a Sicilian Greek contemporary of Agathocles whose treatment of the tyrant was personally hostile. Modern scholarship reads Diodorus's portrayal of Agathocles partly as a transmission of Timaeus's anti-Agathoclean framing rather than a neutral account.

  Cited at 12.15

• Major Italian allies of Rome, including Capua, the second-largest city of Italy, and most of the Greek south, defected to Hannibal in the weeks and months after Cannae.

  Cited at 3.118

• Roman losses at Cannae were among the highest of any single day in the history of warfare, perhaps 50,000–70,000 dead and 10,000 captured. Carthaginian losses were under 10,000.

  Cited at 3.117

• Hannibal's deliberate tactical design at Cannae was a double envelopment: a forward crescent of weaker Iberian and Gallic infantry that gave ground under Roman pressure, while veteran African heavy infantry on the wings held position and then wheeled inward against the Roman flanks, with the cavalry, victorious on both wings, completing the encirclement from the rear.

  Cited at 3.113-117

• Maharbal urged Hannibal to march directly on Rome immediately after Cannae and, when Hannibal refused, replied "you know how to win a victory, Hannibal, but you do not know how to use one."

  Cited at 3.118

• Cannae did not produce Roman political collapse. The senate refused to negotiate with Hannibal, refused to ransom captured prisoners, and within months had raised replacement legions and resumed the war effort.

  Cited at 3.118, 6.58

• Cannae transformed Roman strategic and tactical thinking in the long run, driving the return to Fabian avoidance of decisive engagement, the systematic destruction of the Roman senatorial-tribunate command pool, and the eventual Scipionic reforms that produced the more flexible manipular practice on display at Zama.

  Cited at 6.58

• At Cannae the Roman force outnumbered Hannibal's army roughly two-to-one in infantry but was inferior in cavalry, approximately 80,000 Roman infantry and 6,000 cavalry against 40,000 Carthaginian infantry and 10,000 cavalry.

  Cited at 3.107, 3.113

• Carthage responded to the Mamertine appeal first, establishing a garrison at Messana under a commander named Hanno before the Roman expedition arrived.

  Cited at 1.10-11, 3.26

• The comitia centuriata voted for war after being persuaded, by the consuls, in Polybius's account, by the prospect of plunder and the argument that allowing Carthaginian control of Messana would put a hostile power on the Italian doorstep.

  Cited at 1.11

• Appius Claudius Caudex's crossing of the Strait of Messina in 264 BCE was the first time a Roman army had ever deployed outside the Italian peninsula, a structural shift whose long-term significance is underemphasized in narrative accounts focused on the Mamertine crisis.

  Cited at 1.11-12

• The Mamertines of Messana, threatened by Hiero II of Syracuse, appealed for protection both to Carthage and to Rome in 265 or early 264 BCE.

  Cited at 1.10

• Philinus of Akragas alleged in a now-lost history that Rome had violated an existing treaty with Carthage by intervening in Sicily, a claim Polybius preserves only in order to reject it.

  Cited at 3.26

• The Roman senate was divided on whether to intervene at Messana, and the matter was referred to the comitia centuriata for decision, an unusual constitutional step that suggests serious doubt about the legitimacy or wisdom of the war.

  Cited at 1.11

• The Treaty of 201 BCE imposed on Carthage: a 10,000-talent indemnity payable over 50 years, surrender of all war elephants and prohibition on training more, reduction of the navy to 10 triremes, return of all Roman prisoners and deserters, 100 hostages, recognition of Masinissa's expanded Numidian kingdom, and prohibitions on warfare both outside Africa (without Roman consent) and within Africa against Roman allies.

  Cited at 15.18

• Carthaginian losses at Zama were severe, perhaps 20,000 dead and a comparable number captured, while Roman losses were comparatively light.

  Cited at 15.14

• Zama was decided by the Roman and Numidian cavalry under Laelius and Masinissa, who drove off the Carthaginian horse early in the battle and then returned to attack Hannibal's veteran third line in the rear.

  Cited at 15.12, 15.14

• Hannibal deployed approximately 80 war elephants at the Battle of Zama.

  Cited at 15.11.1

• Hannibal's elephants at Zama were inadequately trained, contributing to their failure when Scipio's maniples opened lanes for them to charge through harmlessly.

  Cited at 15.12

• Zama ended Carthage as a great power.

  Cited at 15.18

• Hannibal and Scipio met in person before the battle and exchanged speeches through interpreters, with Hannibal proposing peace terms that Scipio rejected.

  Cited at 15.6-8

• The Battle of Zama was fought near Naraggara (modern Sakiet Sidi Youssef, Tunisia), not at Zama Regia itself, despite the traditional name.

  Cited at 15.5.14

• Scipio departed from standard Roman manipular deployment by aligning his maniples in straight columns with open lanes, rather than the usual staggered (quincunx) arrangement, so that Hannibal's elephants could be channeled through the lanes without disrupting the Roman line.

  Cited at 15.9

• The forces engaged at Zama were comparable in infantry strength but Rome held a decisive advantage in cavalry, likely 6,000 horse to roughly 3,000–4,000 for Carthage.

  Cited at 15.3, 15.9