Modern scholarship · modern scholarship

Hannibal's Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western Mediterranean, 247–183 BC

Dexter Hoyos

Composition

2003 CE

Language: english

A scholarly history of the Barcid family's command of Carthaginian political and military affairs from Hamilcar's emergence in the First Punic War to Hannibal's death in 183 BCE. Hoyos treats the Barcids as a political dynasty operating within Carthaginian factional politics rather than as autonomous warlords, and gives sustained attention to the Iberian command and to Hannibal's career after Zama as suffete and exile. Strong on military analysis and on Carthaginian politics; complemented by Hoyos's later The Carthaginians (2010) for institutional and cultural context.

Claims citing this source

Cannae did not produce Roman political collapse. The senate refused to negotiate with Hannibal, refused to ransom captured prisoners, and within months had raised replacement legions and resumed the war effort.
Zama was decided by the Roman and Numidian cavalry under Laelius and Masinissa, who drove off the Carthaginian horse early in the battle and then returned to attack Hannibal's veteran third line in the rear.
Hannibal's elephants at Zama were inadequately trained, contributing to their failure when Scipio's maniples opened lanes for them to charge through harmlessly.

Cited at ch. on Zama
Hannibal and Scipio met in person before the battle and exchanged speeches through interpreters, with Hannibal proposing peace terms that Scipio rejected.
Scipio departed from standard Roman manipular deployment by aligning his maniples in straight columns with open lanes, rather than the usual staggered (quincunx) arrangement, so that Hannibal's elephants could be channeled through the lanes without disrupting the Roman line.
The forces engaged at Zama were comparable in infantry strength but Rome held a decisive advantage in cavalry, likely 6,000 horse to roughly 3,000–4,000 for Carthage.